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The Syrian Civil War has been described as an "intensely sectarian conflict". The focus of the conflict has been identified as a ruling minority Alawite government (with Alawites being a largely syncretic Shiite Muslim offshoot from which President Assad's most senior political and military associates are drawn) and allied Shi'a governments such as Iran, pitted against the country's Sunni Muslim majority who are aligned with the Syrian opposition and their Sunni Turkish and Persian Gulf State backers. The conflict had drawn in other ethno-religious minorities, including Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Palestinians, Kurds, Yazidi, Mhallami, Arab Christians, Mandaeans, Turkmens and Greeks.〔 In 2012 the first Christian Free Syrian Army unit formed, yet it was reported that the Assad government still had the reluctant support of the majority of the country's Christians of various ethnicities and denominations.〔(Syria's Christians continue to stand by Assad regime ) ''Global Post'' February 6, 2012.〕〔(Christians in Syria live in uneasy alliance with Assad, Alawites ) ''USA Today'' May 10, 2012.〕 By 2013 an increasing number of Christians favored the opposition. In 2014, the predominantly Christian Syriac Military Council formed an alliance with the FSA, and other Syrian Christian militias such as the Sutoro had joined the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime. The Alawite sect of Shia Islam has the second highest religious following in the Syrian Arab Republic and remains at the heart of the Assad regime's grassroot support. Incidents of sectarianism amongst the Sunni population have been said to be rooted in that both Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad are Alawites, a minority some Sunnis see as heretics. Additionally, the Syrian government maintains a gang network known as the ''shabiha'', a shadow militia that anti-government activists allege are prepared to use force, violence, weapons and racketeering, whose members primarily consist of Alawites. Further Shia sectarian motivations are apparent in the Iranian training and equipping of Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to fight with various sectarian militias in Syria, as well as the Assad regime's coordination with the Houthi of Yemen. Minorities such as the Druze and Ismailis have refused to join these militas or be associated with the regime, with even Alawites and Christians who are openly pro regime also refusing to join these militas or serve their conscription terms. ==Background== After hopes that an era of political liberalization might follow Bashar al-Assad's succession of his father these hopes flickered as Assad tightened his grip. He reined in Islamist opponents but sought to broaden his power base beyond minority sects. He promoted Sunnis to power and restored ties to Aleppo - a Sunni stronghold with which relations had been tense since the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s.〔Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle east, p.476-477〕 He adopted a more religious aspect, leaking videos of one of his sons reciting the Qur'an. While continuing to look to Iran for military supplies he improved ties with Turkey. Yet Assad's policy of adopting a ''jihadi'' discourse on Iraq and Palestine carried risks and "enabled previously latent ethnic and sectarian tensions to surface, Sunni groups to organize, and unsettled other sects and power clusters who had prospered under his father" Hafez al-Assad.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian Civil War」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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